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SECURITIES AND FINANCIAL REGULATION
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
by Karen Patton Seymour*
INTRODUCTION
The Second Circuit has long been the country’s preeminent court in the
field of securities and financial regulation.1 Since the passage of the
Securities Act of 1933 (“the Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (“the Exchange Act”), the Second Circuit has been the leading
interpreter of U.S. securities laws and arguably the most influential court in
the area of securities regulation in the world. From 1961 to 1978, the
Second Circuit produced nearly five times as many securities law opinions
as the average federal appellate court; the Second Circuit alone was
responsible for one-third of all securities opinions issued by appellate
courts.2 Particularly, the Second Circuit handed down up to 70 percent of
the opinions that appear in securities law casebooks covering the same
period.3 It is little wonder, then, that the Supreme Court frequently has
called the Second Circuit the “Mother Court” in the area of securities.4
The Second Circuit’s influence in the realm of securities goes beyond
pure numbers. The court’s membership has included several celebrated
judges who have been particularly influential in the field of securities
regulation, among them Learned Hand and Henry Friendly. According to
some, Judge Friendly did more to influence the law of securities regulation
* B.A./B.S., Southern Methodist University, 1983; J.D., The University of Texas School of
Law, 1986; L.L.M., University Of London, 1987; Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP;
Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District Of New York,
1990–96; Chief of the Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of
New York, 2002–04. The author would like to acknowledge the contributions of Sullivan &
Cromwell associates John J. Hughes, III, and Jeremy O. Bressman and summer associates
Markus Brazil, Chris Brown, Beth Olsen, and Alex Self.
1. See JEFFREY B. MORRIS, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT: A HISTORY OF
UNITED STATES COURTS IN NEW YORK, CONNECTICUT & VERMONT 1787–1987, at 151
(1987).
2. See Margaret V. Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities Regulation: The
Creation of a Judicial Reputation, 50 SMU L. REV. 777, 792 (1997).
3. See id. at 793.
4. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 275–76 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring
in judgment) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)).
Indeed, in a recent book, Justice Stephen Breyer comments that securities cases emanating
from the Second Circuit have “had considerable influence, because the legal community has
long thought that the Second Circuit . . . understood securities law and securities markets
especially well.” STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE
NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 115 (2015).
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than any other judge in U.S. history.5 The reputation of the Second Circuit
in the realm of securities has been so great that other courts, including the
Supreme Court, often mention by name the particular judges that decided a
given Second Circuit precedent to justify their reliance on that decision.6
And many courts have long looked to its jurisprudence for guidance in
deciding novel or complex securities law issues.
Several factors may explain the Second Circuit’s distinctive influence in
these fields. The Second Circuit has a distinct geographic advantage: its
jurisdiction includes New York City, home to the largest securities market
in the world. Another factor at play is the sophisticated bar, including both
government lawyers and private practitioners that practice in the circuit.
Indeed, some leading securities lawyers—for example, Jerome Frank, a
one-time chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission—have sat
on the Second Circuit bench.
Given its preeminence in this field, the Second Circuit has often been the
court to pave new ground in the realm of securities law. It was the first
appellate court to recognize a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5.7 It
was one of the first courts to create liability under that rule for trading on
nonpublic information.8 And a landmark ruling in 2014 limiting “tippee
liability” in insider trading cases came from the Second Circuit.9 These
innovations, which continue to this day, have gone a long way toward
establishing the Second Circuit as the vanguard of the federal appellate
courts in the field of securities.
I. DEVELOPING ROBUST CIVIL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
FOR THE SECURITIES LAWS
The following sections track the Second Circuit’s significant role in
developing civil enforcement mechanisms for federal securities laws,
including taking the lead in defining the scope of SEC enforcement actions
and private rights of actions.
A. New Securities Laws Passed During the New Deal
In the throes of the Great Depression and informed by lessons of the
stock market crash of October 1929, Congress passed the Securities Act and

5. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 275–76 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Louis Loss, In
Memoriam: Henry J. Friendly, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1722, 1723 (1986)); Sachs, supra note 2,
at 780–81. Indeed, Friendly’s name is invoked in ten securities opinions of the U.S.
Supreme Court and in over three hundred securities opinions outside of the Second Circuit.
Sachs, supra note 2, at 781.
6. See, e.g., Morrison, 561 U.S. at 275 (Stevens, J., concurring); Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 238–39 (1988); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 723; Fulton Cty. Emps. Ret.
Sys. v. MGIC Inv. Corp., 675 F.3d 1047, 1050 (7th Cir. 2012); Liberty Prop. Trust v.
Republic Props. Corp., 577 F.3d 335, 342 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Randolph, J., dissenting).
7. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730.
8. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
9. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
242 (2015).
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the Exchange Act.10 The Exchange Act created the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and gave it the mission of enforcing new
securities laws created to restore investor confidence in U.S. capital
markets.11 From their inception, the SEC and these new securities laws
were controversial.12 Contemporary critics raised questions about the
constitutionality of these new laws.13 But the SEC successfully withstood
these tests, and its enforcement authority quickly became a powerful tool.
With it, the Second Circuit became an important forum for litigating
enforcement actions.
One of the first of such actions, Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC,14 helped
redefine the relationship between broker-dealers and their customers. The
SEC found that Charles Hughes, a registered broker-dealer firm, sold
securities well above their market prices without disclosing this fact to its
customers (primarily homemakers and widows).15 The SEC revoked
Charles Hughes’s broker-dealer registration.16 Hughes challenged that
decision on several grounds, including that the SEC did not have sufficient
evidence to prove a violation of the securities laws.17 Though the Second
Circuit conceded that there was minimal evidence that he actually made
false statements to its customers, the court affirmed the penalty, concluding
that Hughes’s fraud consisted of its failure to disclose the large markup it
added to market prices.18 The court reasoned that broker-dealers “hold[]

10. The acts were informed by a report of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency that described the abuses in the securities markets. The report attributed the stock
market crash to many of these abuses. Philip A. Loomis, Jr., The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214, 215–17 (1959);
see also James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (1959) (“[The Senate Banking and Currency Committee] spread on the
record more than the peccadillos of groups of men involved in the issuance and marketing of
securities. It indicted a system as a whole that had failed miserably . . . .”).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78d(a), 78n(a) (2012); Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann,
Introductory Comment: A Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 329–30 (“These new securities laws
were among the many Roosevelt Administration efforts to stimulate the economy and restore
confidence in the capitalist system.”).
12. Milton V. Freeman, A Private Practitioner’s View of the Development of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 18, 1819 (“When the SEC
was established in 1934 . . . there was no real acceptance of the [acts] in the financial
community. . . . In the earlier years there was substantial dispute between the [SEC] on the
one hand, and the New York Stock Exchange and the investment banking industry on the
other.”).
13. Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 11, at 337. See generally Jacob Lippman,
Constitutionality of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 9 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1 (1934)
(discussing the constitutionality of the Securities Act and the SEC’s authority). The SEC’s
perceived legitimacy was not aided by the appointment of Joseph Kennedy to the
Commission, as he may have made much of his fortune through market manipulation and
insider trading. Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 11, at 348. Roosevelt jokingly adopted the
motto “it-takes-a-thief-to-catch-a-thief.” Id.
14. 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943).
15. Id. at 436.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
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[themselves] out as competent to advise” and that “in view of [their] expert
knowledge . . . [were under a duty] not to take advantage of its customers’
ignorance of market conditions.”19 In so holding, the Second Circuit was
the first court to adopt the SEC’s “shingle theory”—the theory that brokerdealers, simply by virtue of their position, make an implied representation
to customers that they will be dealt with fairly.20 The SEC later expanded
this theory and applied it in a number of cases, bringing actions against
broker-dealers for “churning” (a practice of trading stocks repeatedly in a
client’s account to generate more commissions), high-pressure sales tactics,
and failing to disclose conflicts of interest, among others.21
Charles Hughes also set the stage for Judge Charles Clark’s widely cited
dissent in Baird v. Franklin.22 The suit in Baird resulted from a scandal
involving the Wall Street giant Richard Whitney, the wealthy and wellconnected president of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).23 Whitney
had been hailed as the “Great White Knight” of Wall Street during the 1929
market crash when he bought shares of blue-chip stocks as the market
fell—helping eventually to stabilize the market and end the crash.24 As
president of the country’s largest stock exchange, he had opposed the new
securities laws when President Roosevelt originally proposed them.25
During the recessionary year of 1937, Whitney’s firm, Richard Whitney
& Co., became strapped for cash.26 To prop up the firm, Whitney used
some of his clients’ securities as collateral (without authorization),
including securities belonging to the New York Yacht Club, of which he
was the treasurer. Although members of the NYSE Committee were aware
of these unlawful activities, they took no action against Whitney.27 A few
months later, as rumors were circulating that Richard Whitney & Co. was
insolvent, NYSE accountants audited the company and learned that the firm
had been operating with insufficient capital. The firm quickly failed, and
two customers of the firm—Mary Stevens Baird and the New York Yacht
Club—sued Arthur Franklin, treasurer of the NYSE, for their losses.28
A majority of the Second Circuit panel, in a brief opinion by Judge
Augustus Hand, affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of Baird’s claim on
19. Id. at 437.
20. See Carl Wartman, Broker Dealers, Market Makers and Fiduciary Duties, 9 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 746, 749 (1978) (explaining that Charles Hughes served as the judicial affirmation
of the shingle theory).
21. Id. at 749–50.
22. 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1944).
23. Id. at 239–40.
24. Michael Beschloss, From White Knight to Thief, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/upshot/from-white-knight-to-thief.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/AR9K-TGH2].
25. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72nd Congress) and S. Res. 56
and S. Res. 97 (73rd Congress) Before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, 73d
Cong. 6582 passim (1934) (statement of Richard Whitney, President of the New York Stock
Exchange).
26. See Baird, 141 F.2d at 240.
27. See id. at 241.
28. See id.
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the grounds that she could not prove that the NYSE’s inaction caused her
losses.29 Judge Clark dissented vigorously. Citing Hughes, Clark reasoned
that, although the securities regulations do not explicitly provide for a
private right of action, the purpose of the Securities and Exchange Acts is to
protect unsophisticated investors from the “overreaching[]” of those who
understand the securities markets.30 Without a private right of action, Clark
argued, the “avowed purpose of [protecting investors] would indeed be a
snare and a delusion.”31 Although it did not carry the day in the Second
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit later adopted Judge Clark’s reasoning.32 Judge
Clark’s dissent also provided a legal foundation to hold stock exchanges
liable for the activities of their members and was one of the first opinions to
articulate a theory of private action under the securities laws. Less than two
months after his Baird dissent, Justice Clark cited his dissent in an opinion
suggesting that the Securities and Exchange Acts implied a private right of
action.33
B. Development of the Private Right of Action
In retrospect, the Second Circuit’s eventual holding that the securities
laws create a private right of action for fraud was one of the most
significant Second Circuit rulings on securities regulation in history,
although that may not have been apparent at the time, when federal courts
regularly fashioned private rights of action based on traditional tort law
concepts and the equity maxim that “every right withheld must have a
remedy.”34 The Supreme Court championed this principle as early as
Marbury v. Madison,35 proclaiming, “[i]t is a settled and invariable
principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every
injury its proper redress.”36 This sentiment reached its heyday in the
Supreme Court’s 1917 decision in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby,37
a decision later used to find private rights of action under the securities
laws, in which the Court found:
A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it
results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is

29. Id. at 239.
30. Id. at 245 (Clark, J., dissenting).
31. Id.
32. Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1953) (“We are in substantial
agreement with Judge Clark’s dissenting opinion in the case of Baird v. Franklin . . . .”).
33. Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 427 (2d Cir. 1944). Judge Augustus Hand,
who had written the majority opinion in Baird, joined that opinion.
34. Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of
Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 864 n.15 (1996); see, e.g.,
Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1916).
35. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
36. Id. at 147; see Stabile, supra note 34, at 864 n.15.
37. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
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implied . . . . This is but an application of the maxim, Ubi jus ibi
remedium [(where there is a right, there is a remedy)].38

Beginning in the 1930s, the standards for recognizing new implied causes
of action became stricter.39 The explosion of governmental regulation
during the New Deal led to greater reluctance by courts to imply new
private rights of action. Judges were increasingly concerned that treating
every violation of a federal statute or regulation as a tort that entitled private
plaintiffs to sue would unleash an unmanageable flood of litigation and
upset Congress’s intended methods of enforcement—especially when the
statutes and regulations themselves were written in broad, remedial terms
that did not supply a precise rule of decision for a court to apply.40 But the
movement against implying new private rights of action was gradual—and
federal courts resisted the application of this trend to the federal securities
laws for several decades.41
At least one commentator has described the period leading up to the mid1970s as the Supreme Court’s “ebullient stage” for recognizing private
rights of action under the securities laws,42 a description that applies
equally to the Second Circuit’s treatment of such rights during this era.43
Most sections of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act have no explicit
provisions giving private plaintiffs the right to sue,44 and the statutes
arguably contemplated that the SEC and U.S. Department of Justice would
have exclusive enforcement powers. Those agencies were explicitly
empowered under the statutes to pursue administrative, civil, and criminal
remedies, while the statutes were silent about private litigation.45 During
the 1950s and 1960s, federal courts nevertheless recognized private rights
of action under key provisions, including section 10(b), Rule 10b-5 (the
general antifraud provision), and section 14(a) (the requirement to abide by
the SEC’s regulations in soliciting proxies) of the Exchange Act. The
Second Circuit had a leading role in creating these implied causes of
action.46
In Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co.,47 the Second Circuit
became the first appellate court in the country to hold that there is an
38. Id. at 39–40; see, e.g., H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation,
Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L.
REV., 501, 554–55 (1986); Donald M. Klein, The Extension of a Private Remedy to
Defrauded Securities Investors Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 81, 88 (1965).
39. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288–90 (2001); Stabile, supra note
34, at 865.
40. See Foy, supra note 38, at 549–50, 554–56.
41. See Roy L. Brooks, Rule 10b-5 in the Balance: An Analysis of the Supreme Court’s
Policy Perspective, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 411 (1980).
42. 2 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1625–28 (2011).
43. Brooks, supra note 41, at 411.
44. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 42, at 1615 (noting that besides the provision voiding
contracts in violation of the act under section 29(b), sections 9(e), 16(b), and 18 are the only
sections of the Exchange Act that have express private civil liability provisions).
45. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t, 78u (2012); LOSS ET AL., supra note 42, at 1928–29.
46. Brooks, supra note 41, at 411.
47. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
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implied private right of action for fraud under Rule 10b-5.48 Six years
earlier, Judge Andrew Kirkpatrick of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
had recognized such an implied right,49 serving as a catalyst for other courts
around the country.50 When the Second Circuit decided Fischman, Judge
Jerome Frank took the existence of such an implied right nearly as a given,
dedicating only two sentences to the issue in the body of the opinion:
“Section 10(b), to be sure, does not explicitly authorize a civil remedy.
Since, however, it does make ‘unlawful’ the conduct it describes, it creates
such a remedy.”51 Judge Frank added a footnote with a lengthy quotation
from a Yale Law Journal article that argued that Congress had intended to
create a private right of action under the securities laws.52
Although the Second Circuit made quick work of creating a private right
of action under the section 10(b) antifraud provision, it hesitated to expand
the private right of action to section 14(a), which requires certain
disclosures in proxy solicitations. Four years after Fischman, in Subin v.
Goldsmith,53 a fractured panel affirmed dismissal of claims brought by a
shareholder under section 14(a). Judge Harold Medina, in an opinion
concurring (in part) with the result, argued that “it is at least doubtful that it
was the intention of the Congress to create any substantive rights by the
provisions of [s]ection 14(a).”54
Judge Frank dissented and argued that section 14(a) was no different than
other sections of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act under which the
court had already recognized implied private rights of action.55 Judge
Frank’s Subin dissent soon won out. In Brown v. Bullock,56 Judge Clark
predicted that the Second Circuit would have to revisit “the much
criticized” decision in Howard v. Furst,57 which had reiterated the Subin
majority’s position.58 The Supreme Court did so first, abrogating Furst in
its 1964 decision J.I. Case Co. v. Borak59 and adopting Judge Frank’s
position.60 That holding endures to this day.61
48. In dicta, Slavin v. Germantown Fire Insurance Co., 174 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1949),
suggested the existence of a private right of action under Rule 10b-5 was suggested. See id.
However, the Second Circuit was the first appellate court to hold that a private right of
action actually exists under Rule 10b-5.
49. Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946); William C.
Baskin III, Using Rule 9(b) to Reduce Nuisance Securities Litigation, 99 YALE L.J. 1591,
1591 n.4 (1990).
50. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 590–91 & n.20 (2003).
51. Fischman, 188 F.2d at 787.
52. See id. at 787 n.4 (quoting The Prospects for Rule X-10b-5: An Emerging Remedy
for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1134 (1950)).
53. 224 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1955).
54. Id. at 774 (Medina, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
55. Id. at 765–66 (Frank, J., dissenting).
56. 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
57. 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956).
58. See Bullock, 294 F.2d at 415, 422 (Clark, J., concurring).
59. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). The Second Circuit acknowledged as much in Studebaker
Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 695 (2d Cir. 1966).
60. Borak, 377 U.S. at 435.
61. See, e.g., Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1104 n.11 (1991).
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The Second Circuit also played a central role in shaping the territorial
scope of the private rights of action during the 1960s and 1970s.62 In
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,63 the Second Circuit found that an American
investor could sue a foreign issuer under Rule 10b-5 if the conduct
“has . . . a sufficiently serious effect upon [U.S.] commerce to warrant
assertion of jurisdiction for the protection of American investors.”64 Four
years later, in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,65
Judge Friendly decided that foreign plaintiffs also could seek damages
under Rule 10b-5 if a substantial amount of the allegedly fraudulent
conduct occurred in the United States.66 Schoenbaum and Leasco served as
the twin origins of the “conduct and effects” test to determine the
extraterritorial scope of 10b-5.67 The other circuits followed the Second
Circuit’s lead and adopted versions of these tests, with some circuits even
debating whether each court had “accurately” captured the Second Circuit’s
jurisprudence.68
C. SEC Enforcement
Even as private remedies under the securities laws expanded, the basic
authority of the SEC to bring enforcement actions was frequently
challenged in the years after the securities laws were adopted.69 Due to its
location, the Second Circuit became the primary arbiter of the SEC’s
authority—and Second Circuit judges sympathetic to the agency’s goals
proved useful to the SEC.70 The Second Circuit, tracking the political

62. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 42, at 2026–27 & n.1.
63. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), abrogated by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561
U.S. 247 (2010).
64. Id. at 209.
65. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), abrogated by Morrison, 561 U.S. 247.
66. See id. at 1337.
67. The conducts and effects test asks (1) “whether the wrongful conduct had a
substantial effect in the United States or upon [U.S.] citizens” or (2) whether “substantial
acts in furtherance of the fraud were committed within the United States.” See, e.g., SEC v.
Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2003), abrogated by Morrison, 561 U.S. 247.
68. See, e.g., Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665 n.10 (7th Cir. 1998),
abrogated by Morrison, 561 U.S. 247. Of course, both Schoenbaum and Leasco were later
abrogated by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd., 561
U.S. 247 (2010). See infra Part II.D.
69. See, e.g., Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943) (involving one
of the earliest SEC enforcement actions); see also R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690
(2d Cir. 1952) (involving a challenge to an SEC order that provided for the suspension of a
company from membership in the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD));
Phillips v. SEC, 153 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1946) (involving a challenge to an SEC order
providing for a change in the capital structure of a corporation).
70. See John P. Frank, The Top U.S. Commercial Court, FORTUNE, Jan. 1951, at 92. In
the 1940s and 1950s, Judges Clark and Frank provided the SEC with an expertise in
securities laws that was scarcely paralleled in both the judiciary and the academy. See supra
Part II.B for a description of the prowess of Judge Clark in Fischman v. Raytheon
Manufacturing Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), and the prescience of Judge Frank’s dissent
in Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1955). It was little wonder that the Second
Circuit was considered the best commercial circuit in the country at the time. See James
Oakes, Personal Reflections on Learned Hand and the Second Circuit, 47 STAN. L. REV.
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economy of the time, granted fairly broad authority to the SEC to protect
the public against savvier investors that would prey upon them. This is not
to say that the Second Circuit provided the SEC with a blank check.71
Nonetheless, in the aggregate, the Second Circuit served as friend, rather
than foe, to the SEC in its formative years.
Somewhat surprisingly, the SEC’s enforcement powers were relatively
limited until 1990.72 The SEC could enjoin future violations of law and
seek the equitable assistance of federal courts to obtain disgorgement or
restitution for violations.73 But the SEC had no power to seek financial
penalties in most cases.74 When several major financial scandals came to
light in the 1980s,75 Congress created the National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (“the Commission”) to suggest ways in
which fraud could be reduced.76 The Commission, headed by former SEC
Commissioner James Treadway, Jr., recommended expanding the
enforcement remedies allotted to the SEC.77 In response, Congress passed
the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act (“the
Remedies Act”) in 1990, which expanded the SEC’s power to include four
new classes of penalties, ranging from civil monetary penalties to officer
and director bars.78
387, 387–88 (1994) (collecting praise of the Second Circuit during Learned Hand’s tenure
on the court).
71. Judge Friendly’s opinion in Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir.
1976), is demonstrative of the pragmatic manner in which the Second Circuit dealt with the
SEC. Lipper concerned the appeal of a broker, Lipper Corp., from an order by the SEC
cancelling its registration and barring it from participating in the securities market. Id. at
173. Judge Friendly read narrowly an earlier Second Circuit case, Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d
89 (2d Cir. 1940), that had suggested that the Second Circuit lacked power to review
penalties imposed by the SEC. He ruled that debarment was “too severe” a sanction and
modified the sanction to a twelve-month suspension of Lipper’s registration. Id.; see also
Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 583 (2d Cir. 1979) (Kaufman, J., concurring)
(noting that while the SEC’s “findings and choice of sanctions will often be upheld on
review,” the “courts have not remained idle” when the SEC goes too far in pursuing its
objectives); Klein v. SEC, 224 F.2d 861, 866 (2d Cir. 1955) (holding that an SEC
disciplinary action against a broker for the violation of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice was
unsubstantiated and therefore constituted error).
72. See Richard A. Spehr & Michelle J. Annunziata, The Remedies Act Turns Fifteen:
What Is Its Relevance Today?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 587, 588 (2005) (noting the SEC’s
limited power to impose penalties prior to the passing of the Securities Enforcement
Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990).
73. Insider trading was one exception. Id.; see also Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting that the SEC has no statutory
authority to seek rescission, restitution, or other forms of equitable monetary relief but may
seek the equitable assistance of a district court).
74. Spehr & Annunziata, supra note 72.
75. See Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review
of the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 367, 387 (2008) (noting how “[i]n the mid-1980s, insider-trading scandals dominated the
financial news”).
76. Id. at 388.
77. Id. at 388–89.
78. See Spehr & Annunziata, supra note 72, at 589 (noting that the four new classes of
SEC authority included “(1) cease and desist authority; (2) civil monetary penalties; (3)
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains; and (4) officer and director bars”).

234

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

The Second Circuit suddenly had to adjudicate the legitimacy of the
SEC’s power in an age where it had a significantly expanded arsenal of
sanctions at its disposal.79 SEC v. Patel80 is an important example of the
court’s approach to the most drastic sanction provided by the Remedies
Act: the power to prohibit an individual from serving as an officer or
director of any public company where that person’s conduct “demonstrates
unfitness to serve as an officer or director.”81 In Patel, appellant-defendant
Ratilal Patel, founder and director of Par Pharmaceutical, Inc., had
submitted a misleading application to the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) for approval of a new generic medication.82 A few months before
the news of this misleading application came to light, Patel sold a
significant amount of his common stock in Par.83 Once it became public
knowledge that Patel’s application was misleading, Par’s stock price
declined appreciably.84 Patel ultimately resigned and pled guilty to
conspiring to defraud the FDA.85 The SEC then proceeded with its own
enforcement order in the Southern District of New York, and the district
court, at the SEC’s urging, imposed various civil penalties upon Patel,
including an order barring him from serving as an officer or director of a
public company.86
Patel appealed, and the Second Circuit reversed the sanctions imposed
against him.87 Relying on the heightened standard of “substantial
unfitness” provided in the Remedies Act, the court held that, despite the
gravity of Patel’s misdeeds, “[t]he loss of livelihood and the stigma
attached to permanent exclusion from the corporate suite . . . requires
more.”88 In particular, the court noted that it was essential, in the absence
of past violations, “that a district court articulate the factual basis for a
finding of the likelihood of recurrence” necessary to justify the imposition
of a permanent bar.89
Patel was quickly seen as a significant decision. Other circuits adopted
the Second Circuit’s Patel standard.90 Stephen M. Cutler, director of the
SEC’s Enforcement Division at the time, criticized the Patel decision for
creating “a burdensome and overly restrictive test” that placed “an
unreasonably high” burden on the SEC.91 In response to Patel and other

79. Id.
80. 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995).
81. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
82. Patel, 61 F.3d at 138.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 139.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 142.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp., 142 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 1998).
91. Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. SEC, Remarks at the Glasser Legal
Works 20th Annual Federal Securities Institute (Feb. 15, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch538.htm [https://perma.cc/2FX9-8Z52].
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decisions applying its principle,92 the SEC reduced the number of cases in
which it sought officer bars in order to avoid rejection from the courts.93
The Second Circuit’s interpretation of “substantial fitness” remained
good law through the early 2000s, when the Internet bubble popped and
Enron collapsed. Soon thereafter, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
in 2002.94 Sarbanes-Oxley, like the Remedies Act, responded to various
financial indiscretions by increasing the sanctioning power of the SEC.
Notably, Sarbanes-Oxley responded to the SEC’s concerns regarding Patel
by lowering the standard for entering a suspension or bar order from a
“substantial unfitness to serve as an officer or director” to merely
“unfitness” to perform such roles.95 In other words, the Second Circuit’s
Patel decision helped spur Congress to give the SEC more power to deal
effectively with financial indiscretion. Congress further expanded the
SEC’s power in enacting the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act96 in 2010, arguably the most impactful piece of
regulatory legislation since the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.
In contrast to its holding narrowing the punitive purview of the SEC in
Patel, the Second Circuit upheld and even expanded the power of district
courts to fashion other equitable remedies. In SEC v. First Jersey Security,
Inc.,97 the court made clear that district courts have broad discretion in
fashioning equitable remedies for securities violations.98 First Jersey
concerned a company that had induced its customers to buy various
securities from the firm at excessive prices through fraudulent practices.99
The SEC initiated an enforcement action against the company, and a bench
trial followed in the Southern District of New York.100 The district court
held the defendants liable for federal securities law violations and enjoined
future violations, ordered disgorgement of unlawful gains, and assessed
prejudgment interest.101 On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld nearly all of
the district court’s sanctions, noting that once a “district court has found
federal securities law violations, it has broad equitable power to fashion

92. See, e.g., SEC v. McCaskey, No. 98-cv-6153 (SWK), 2001 WL 1029053, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2001) (citing to Patel in denying the SEC’s request for a permanent
officer and director bar against a recidivist defendant who manipulated his company’s stock
price); SEC v. Farrell, No. 95-CV-6133T, 1996 WL 788367, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1996)
(applying Patel in denying a permanent bar for a defendant convicted and jailed for insider
trading).
93. See Cutler, supra note 91 (noting that “the [SEC] is compelled to seek in court only
what it realistically can expect to obtain”).
94. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1544–45 (2005) (describing the background behind the
act’s passing).
95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2) (2012).
96. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
97. 101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996).
98. Id. at 1474–75.
99. Id. at 1456.
100. Id. at 1459.
101. Id. at 1459–62.
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appropriate remedies.”102 The Second Circuit’s ruling in First Jersey
demonstrates that, while it was loath to allow the imposition of a penalty as
severe as the permanent bar without significant justification, it did allow
courts relative freedom otherwise in fashioning equitable relief.
The Second Circuit’s role in close oversight of the SEC’s enforcement
power continues to this day. Like many civil and criminal actions filed in
the federal courts, many SEC investigations never reach the point of
enforcement but rather settle before they even reach the courts.103 An
important tool in the SEC’s arsenal has been the “no admit, no deny”
consent agreement—in which the defendant agrees to certain penalties
without admitting or denying wrongdoing.104 For many years, courts often
approved consent agreements after a cursory review and without probing
the appropriateness of such a settlement.105
The supremacy of the “no admit, no deny” model has been shaken
recently, both by the SEC and in some courts. In 2013, the SEC changed its
policy on these settlements by expanding the categories and circumstances
in which the SEC would demand admissions from defendants.106 And in
SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc.,107 Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern
District of New York refused to approve a “no admit, no deny” proposed
consent agreement between the SEC and Citigroup on the grounds that the
agreement was “neither fair, nor reasonable, nor adequate, nor in the public
interest” because Citigroup did not have to accept responsibility for the loss
it caused investors.108
The Second Circuit reversed Judge Rakoff’s decision.109 The court held
that Judge Rakoff had abused his discretion in requiring that the SEC
“establish the ‘truth’ of the allegations against a settling party as a condition
for approving the consent decrees.”110 Moreover, the court determined that
the business of determining the public interest “rests squarely with the
SEC,” not the courts.111 Thus, Citigroup reiterated that the SEC could still
count on deference from the Second Circuit when it came to negotiating
consent agreements. Just as the Second Circuit had granted the SEC
significant deference in the aftermath of the Great Depression, Citigroup

102. Id. at 1474. The court denied only the district court’s appointment of a special agent
to investigate whether First Jersey had committed other frauds. Id. at 1479.
103. See George L. Miles, Note, Let Judges Judge: Advancing a Review Framework for
Government Securities Settlements Where Defendants Neither Admit nor Deny Allegations,
46 CONN. L. REV. 1111, 1114 (2014) (“[T]he SEC settles its investigations anywhere from
67%, to 90%, or 98% of the time.”).
104. Matthew G. Neumann, Note, Neither Admit nor Deny: Recent Changes to the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s Longstanding Settlement Policy, 40 J. CORP. L. 793,
796 (2015).
105. Id. at 798–99.
106. Id. at 794.
107. 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
108. Id. at 332.
109. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014).
110. Id. at 295.
111. Id. at 296.
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demonstrates that the court continues to afford such deference well after the
Great Recession.112
D. Reining In Private Securities Fraud Cases
The Second Circuit’s jurisprudence creating private rights of actions
under the securities laws eventually led to a sharp rise in the number of
Rule 10b-5 fraud lawsuits.113 The proliferation of securities fraud suits
raised concerns that the securities laws were inviting frivolous lawsuits
(colloquially termed “strike suits”)114 and that plaintiffs’ allegations often
amounted to “fraud by hindsight.”115 Corporations would settle even
frivolous cases because of the huge costs required to litigate such suits.116
These factors led the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit to rein in
private lawsuits starting in 1975. That year, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores,117 the Supreme Court adopted the Second Circuit’s holding
from Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.118 that only actual purchasers and
sellers of a security could sue under Rule 10b-5.119 The Second Circuit’s
impact could be felt throughout the Supreme Court’s opinion. In the
majority opinion, Justice William Rehnquist noted that the Second Circuit’s
Birnbaum panel consisted of Chief Judge Thomas Swan and Judges
Learned Hand and Augustus Hand, and that “virtually all” lower courts had
Even in dissent, Justice Harry Blackmun
adopted the rule.120
acknowledged that the Birnbaum decision “was pronounced by a justifiably
esteemed panel of that Court of Appeals regarded as the ‘Mother Court’ in
this area of the law.”121
In two other decisions of the same period, the Supreme Court curtailed
some of the Second Circuit’s securities jurisprudence as part of its broader
efforts to narrow the scope of the private right of action. In Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder,122 the Supreme Court held that private plaintiffs must show
scienter, not merely negligence, for Rule 10b-5 civil liability—a shift
112. Private institutions did not receive such deference from the Second Circuit. A few
years before it demonstrated its deference to the SEC’s remedies in Citigroup, the Second
Circuit denied the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)—a private selfregulating national securities organization—the same deference. In Fiero v. Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc., 660 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 2011), the Second Circuit faced a
case in which FINRA sought to enforce monetary penalties against several of its members.
The Second Circuit ultimately held that FINRA lacked the necessary authority to enforce its
pecuniary penalties in federal court. Id. at 574.
113. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 50, at 598 (concerning the emergence of private
rights of action within the sphere of derivative suits).
114. Brooks, supra note 41, at 426 n.138 (discussing the use of statute to deter frivolous
derivative claims).
115. See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 2000).
116. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975); William C.
Baskin III, supra note 49, at 1597–98 & n.43.
117. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
118. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
119. See id. at 464.
120. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 731.
121. Id. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
122. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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toward the views expressed in Judge Friendly’s well-known SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.123 concurrence.124 Likewise, in another reversal of a
Second Circuit decision, the Supreme Court found in Santa Fe Industries v.
Green125 that “corporate mismanagement” alone is not actionable under
Rule 10b-5.126
Beginning in the late 1970s, the Second Circuit, sharing the Supreme
Court’s increasing concerns about frivolous private security actions, began
to narrow the private right of action under Rule 10b-5 by requiring
plaintiffs in the early stages of litigation to plead their claims with
heightened particularity to avoid dismissal.127 Understanding this shift
requires some historical explanation. In the early nineteenth century, courts
demanded that plaintiffs plead their claims in a new lawsuit using precise,
Dissatisfied with this emphasis on
highly stylized language.128
technicalities, legislatures began enacting statutory rules of procedure that
banned excessive formalism. For example, New York’s Field Code,
adopted in 1848, merely required pleadings at the outset of the lawsuit to
include “[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in
ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as
to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended.”129
Despite these new statutory rules, courts continued to emphasize
formality, and pleading continued to serve as a confusing trap for the
unwary.130 To break from this extreme formalism, Judge Charles Clark,
then dean of Yale Law School, and the other drafters of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) ultimately decided to require plaintiffs to file
nothing more than “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.”131 But, in a compromise, the drafters
required more of plaintiffs seeking to bring fraud claims, because of the
frequency of strike suits alleging fraud. Under Rule 9(b) of the FRCP, a
plaintiff bringing a fraud claim must “state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”132
When applying these rules, courts have long debated the proper balance
between allowing vague claims to proceed to burdensome discovery and the
risk that meritorious lawsuits will be dismissed.133 Judge Jerome Frank
championed very lenient pleading requirements. In his Subin dissent, Frank
warned against “revert[ing] to the days when courts construed pleadings

123. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
124. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 209–14, 217 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
125. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
126. Id. at 479.
127. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 435 (1986).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 438.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 433; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
132. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
133. MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURITIES LITIGATION UNDER THE PSLRA, at vii (2015).
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with what today courts consider unreasonable strictness.”134 He rejected
the notion that shareholder lawsuits should be treated any differently:
An economy like ours, which thrives on the fact that thousands of persons
of modest means invest in corporate shares, will be poorly served if our
courts regard with suspicion all minority stockholders’ suits, and
therefore, out of a desire to discourage such suits, apply to them unusually
strict pleading rules . . . . The unfortunate consequence will be that those
in control may be immunized from effective attacks on their misdeeds,
and, as a result, the small investors will lose confidence in all corporate
managements, the honest as well as the dishonest.135

The standard, Judge Frank argued, should only be whether “the plaintiff
would be entitled to no relief under any set of facts which could be
proved.”136 For Judge Frank, the heightened pleadings standard under Rule
9(b) played no role in securities lawsuits and, even if it did, its effect was
limited.137
With the flood of Rule 10b-5 lawsuits, the Second Circuit turned sharply
away from the “no set of facts” standard of review. In Ross v. A.H. Robins
Co.,138 the Second Circuit substituted in a new pleading standard for
securities suits, holding that under Rule 9(b) a plaintiff must “specifically
plead those events which they assert give rise to a strong inference [of
scienter].”139 Drawing upon the Supreme Court’s language in Blue Chip
Stamps, the Second Circuit found that the heightened pleading standard
diminish[es] the possibility that “a plaintiff with a largely groundless
claim [will be able] to simply take up the time of a number of other
people [by extensive discovery] with the right to do so representing an in
terrorem increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonable
founded hope that the process will reveal relevant evidence.”140

This so-called “strong inference of scienter standard” eventually developed
into a two-part test, which required a plaintiff (1) to “alleg[e] facts to show
that defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud” or (2) to
“alleg[e] facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious
misbehavior or recklessness.”141
While two other circuits adopted the Second Circuit’s “strong inference”
standard, other courts declined to do so.142 Those courts maintained that
the Second Circuit’s strong inference test contradicted Rule 9(b)’s plain
134. Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753, 764 (2d Cir. 1955) (Frank, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 767.
136. Id. at 764.
137. Id. at 766.
138. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979).
139. Id. at 558.
140. Id. at 557 (quoting Denny v. Barber 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978)).
141. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994); PERINO, supra
note 133, at 3–11.
142. See, e.g., In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1543 (9th Cir. 1994) (en
banc), superseded by statute as recognized in Ronconi v. Larkin, 253 F.3d 423, 437 n.6 (9th
Cir. 2001); Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1270 n.5 (10th Cir. 1989);
PERINO, supra note 133, at 3–15.
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language that “intent . . . may be alleged generally.”143 Another group of
courts purported to adopt the Second Circuit’s strong inference standard,
but in practice applied the standard with less rigor.144
But the Second Circuit’s approach ultimately won out when Congress
intervened in 1995 with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA). To curb abusive securities lawsuits and to achieve uniformity
among the circuits, the PSLRA adopted the Second Circuit’s strong
inference of scienter standard as a statutory pleading requirement in all
securities fraud cases. Hence, all plaintiffs bringing securities fraud claims
now must plead “with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”145
Since the enactment of the PSLRA, much debate has centered over how
to treat the Second Circuit’s earlier jurisprudence—especially the Second
Circuit’s still uncodified two-part test—in giving meaning to the PSLRA’s
strong inference standard. In Novak v. Kasaks,146 the Second Circuit found
that the PSLRA did not substantially change the Second Circuit’s pleading
standard.147 While Novak disclaimed any rigid reliance on “magic words
such as ‘motive and opportunity,’” the court concluded that its prior
jurisprudence could prove “helpful” in determining what allegations meet
the strong inference of scienter standard.148 Thus, with the adoption of the
PSLRA, the Second Circuit’s influence in this area lives on.
Another example of the Second Circuit limiting the scope of the private
right of action concerns the extraterritorial application of securities laws. In
2010, forty-two years after Schoenbaum, the Supreme Court, in Morrison v.
National Australia Bank,149 put an end to the Second Circuit’s “conduct and
effects” test by limiting the circumstances in which foreign investors could
make use of the securities laws to sue over foreign-based conduct.150 Yet
even there, the Second Circuit and Judge Friendly took center stage. In his
concurrence, Justice Stevens called the Second Circuit’s conduct and effects
test the “north star” coming from the “‘Mother Court’ of securities law”
which has “tended to [the] oak” that grew from the “acorn” of Rule
10b-5.151 Justice Stevens heaped his greatest praise on Judge Friendly, the
author of Leasco, who he termed “the master arborist.”152
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); see, e.g., GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1546–47; Phelps, 886 F.2d at
1270 n.5; PERINO, supra note 133, at 3–15.
144. PERINO, supra note 133, at 3–15.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2012); see Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 321 (2007).
146. 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000).
147. Id. at 305–06.
148. Id. at 311.
149. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
150. Id. at 273.
151. Id. at 275–76 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
152. Id. Not to be outdone, Justice Scalia responded that “[e]ven if one thinks that the
‘conduct’ and ‘effects’ test are numbered among Judge Friendly’s many fine contributions to
the law, his successors, though perhaps under the impression that they nurture the same
mighty oak, are in reality tending each its own botanically distinct tree.” Id. at 259 n.4.
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Since Morrison, the Second Circuit has begun to develop a new body of
law delimiting the territorial scope of the securities laws. In Parkcentral
Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Automobile Holdings,153 the Second Circuit
concluded that a transaction in the United States was necessary, but not
sufficient, for a private plaintiff to seek redress under Rule 10b-5 for
securities not registered on a U.S. exchange.154 The decision addressed
securities-based swap agreements—transactions designed to simulate the
purchase and short sale of a stock between two counterparties, without
either party needing to own the actual security. The parties to the swap
simply select a reference price and agree to exchange money (as opposed to
the stock itself) based on the stock’s subsequent performance.155 The
swaps in Parkcentral Global Hub were executed in the United States, but
the allegedly tortious conduct affecting the stock’s price occurred abroad,
and the security was not traded on a U.S. exchange.156 The Second Circuit
concluded that, although the swap parties effectuated the transactions in the
United States, “the dominance of the foreign elements” foreclosed
Rule 10b-5 private liability.157 In finding for the defendants, the Second
Circuit declined to establish a bright-line test for determining whether a
transaction is sufficiently domestic, but left the issue open for future
development.158
II. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE SECURITIES LAWS
The Second Circuit’s preeminence in securities regulation is also
reflected in its criminal jurisprudence in this area. Second Circuit decisions
sustaining criminal convictions for financial crimes have played a key role
in making criminal prosecution for corporate malfeasance a real weapon.
A. Scienter and Criminal Intent
One important question that the Second Circuit addressed in a series of
cases is the meaning of “scienter” in criminal cases. “Scienter” is a legal
term that refers to an actor’s “intent” or “knowledge.” To convict a
defendant of a financial crime, the government generally must prove that
the defendant acted with scienter, for example, wrongful intent. Difficult
questions sometimes arise as to whether and to what extent it is desirable to
impose criminal liability in situations where the violation was inadvertent
and the offender has no readily ascertainable motive.
In 1969, Judge Henry Friendly’s opinion in United States v. Simon159
became one of the first cases to attempt to define what constitutes a
“willful” and “knowing” misstatement of fact sufficient for criminal
liability under the Exchange Act. The defendants in Simon were three
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

763 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 215.
Id. at 205–07.
See id. at 212–14.
Id. at 212–17.
Id. at 217–18.
425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969).
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accountants at Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, a leading public
accounting firm, who had been convicted of securities fraud for creating,
certifying, and subsequently mailing false and misleading financial
statements for a client of theirs.160 The defendants argued that they had
complied with the literal terms of the General Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) and that compliance alone was sufficient to preclude
any finding that they had intentionally violated the securities laws.161 The
court rejected this argument, and found that even an accountant who
complies with GAAP can be liable if the financial statements create a false
or misleading impression.162
In the wake of Simon, a number of other circuits concluded that
following GAAP was not sufficient to shield an accountant from
liability.163 In a 2002 statement discussing the massive Enron accounting
fraud, then-SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt explained that
the first principle should always be the one Judge Henry Friendly
articulated four decades ago in the Lybrand Ross criminal case, [United
States] v. Simon. . . . [I]f literal compliance with GAAP creates a
fraudulent or materially misleading impression in the minds of
shareholders, the accountants could, and would, be held criminally
liable.164

Simon ultimately resulted in efforts to develop more detailed accounting
guidelines.165
Judge Friendly authored opinions in two additional widely cited cases
that established that it is no defense that the defendant did not know the
precise contours of the regulation that he violated.166 In United States v.
Peltz,167 the defendant learned from a connection of his at the SEC that the
Commission intended to file charges against Georgia Pacific
Corporation.168 He then shorted Georgia Pacific’s stock169 and caused his
broker to violate Rule 10a-1(a) (“the down-tick rule”)—which prohibits a
short sale at a price lower than the last reported price—by falsely telling his
160. Id. at 798–801.
161. See Elliott J. Weiss, The New Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement: Speed Bump
or Road Block?, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 675, 702 n.164 (1995) (noting that “the opinion is rooted
in a view of human behavior that the years have not changed” and collecting recent cases).
162. Simon, 425 F.2d at 805–06.
163. See, e.g., In re K-tel Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1978).
164. Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, U.S. SEC, Public Statement by SEC Chairman: Remarks
at the Winter Bench and Bar Conference of the Federal Bar Council (Feb. 19, 2002),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch539.htm [https://perma.cc/MX4J-HNSN].
165. Charles D. Niemeier, Bd. Member, Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd. (PCAOB),
Keynote Address on Recent International Initiatives, 2008 Sarbanes-Oxley, SEC and
PCAOB Conference, New York State Society of CPAs/FAE Conference (Sept. 10, 2008),
https://pcaobus.org//News//Speech//Pages//09102008_NiemeierNYSSCPAFAEConference.a
spx// [https://perma.cc/ZD4N-TYWU].
166. See United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Peltz,
433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970).
167. 433 F.2d 48 (1970).
168. Id. at 49–50.
169. Id. at 50.
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broker that he was selling to unwind a long position he owned in the stock,
rather than to establish a new short position.170 Peltz claimed that he had
no knowledge of the down-tick rule, and further, that he did not explicitly
instruct the broker to make a short sale.171 But, in affirming his conviction,
the Second Circuit explained that the language of section 32(a) of the
Exchange Act makes clear that “[a] person can willfully violate an SEC rule
even if he does not know of its existence.”172 The court reasoned that Peltz
“willfully” violated the down-tick rule, because his wrongful act of telling
the broker that he was long particular stocks, when he knew that was
untrue, created a “serious risk” that the rule would be violated: the broker
had no way of knowing that the down-tick rule applied to the sales Peltz
was making.173
In United States v. Dixon,174 the Second Circuit further clarified the state
of mind necessary for criminal liability.175 Lloyd Dixon, Jr., the president
of AVM Corporation, the largest producer of mechanical voting machines
in the United States, was charged with failing to disclose personal loans he
had received from the corporation, in violation of SEC rules that require
such disclosures in proxy solicitations.176 On appeal to the Second Circuit,
Dixon argued that he did not know he was required to disclose the loans
under the SEC rules and thus did not “willfully” violate the rules.177 In
affirming Dixon’s conviction, Judge Friendly’s opinion for the court
emphasized that Dixon had engaged in a wrongful act when he manipulated
the corporate books to make his own debts look as though they had
belonged to someone else, and he reasoned that this kind of wrongful act
fell squarely within the ambit of section 32(a) because it led “to the very
violations that would have been prevented if the defendant had acted with
the aim of scrupulously obeying the rules . . . rather than of avoiding
them.”178
The scienter standard the Second Circuit developed in these cases was
widely adopted.179 For example, in United States v. O’Hagan,180 the
170. Id. at 54.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 55.
174. 536 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976).
175. Id. at 1395, 1402.
176. Id. at 1391–92.
177. Id. at 1395–97.
178. Id. at 1395–96.
179. A number of other courts have embraced the Second Circuit’s standard for “willfully
and knowingly.” See, e.g., United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 352 (9th Cir. 1976)
(explicitly embracing the standard articulated in Peltz); see also United States v. Behrens,
713 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir. 2013) (same); Wonsover v. SEC, 205 F.3d 408, 414–15 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (rejecting the argument that specific intent to violate the law is an essential
element of the willfulness required to violate and noting that such an argument had been
rejected by the Second Circuit); Leng-Chia Hung, Securities Markets—A Place to Get Rich
Quick or a Quicksand Going Straight to Jail?: The “Mens Rea” Required for Insider
Trading Criminal Liability, 5 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2010) (“Following [the
decision in Peltz], this approach for ‘no requirement of defendant’s knowledge of the rule’
was adopted by many different jurisdictions in insider trading cases.”).
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Eighth Circuit relied heavily on Dixon’s interpretation of “willfully” to
conclude that a defendant could be criminally liable for insider trading
based only on “the intentional doing of the wrongful acts—no knowledge of
the rule or regulation is required.”181 In fact, O’Hagan argued that he could
not have known his conduct was unlawful because it implicated the
“misappropriation theory” of insider trading, which was first recognized by
the Supreme Court in that very case.182 Despite this, the Eighth Circuit
relied on Dixon and held that criminal liability did not require proof that the
person knew of the rule that made his act illegal.183
B. Procedural Protections in Civil Enforcement Cases
Preceding Criminal Charges
One complication of criminal securities fraud cases is that they often
coincide with simultaneous civil proceedings. This has sometimes raised
questions about how to protect the right of the accused to remain silent in
the criminal proceedings while civil proceedings are also pending (in which
the accused does not have the same right against self-incrimination).
This question is particularly complex because civil proceedings of an
enforcement nature sometimes involve nongovernmental entities.
Oversight of the securities market in the United States has always relied
heavily on self-regulation by private actors. The NYSE was officially
formed in 1817 and, from its inception, was permitted to “regulate its
members as it saw fit.”184 In 1983, Congress amended the Exchange Act to
require almost every SEC-registered brokerage firm to become a member of
a national securities association or a registered exchange.185 Because SelfRegulatory Organizations (SROs), such as the NYSE and the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) have their own procedures for
investigating and disciplining members for violations, a number of
complicated questions have arisen in SRO proceedings. The Second Circuit
has led the way in considering the appropriate role of self-regulation in
securities law.
United States v. Solomon186 is considered to be “[t]he cornerstone federal
decision that analyzes a claim of a privilege against self-incrimination in the
context of a Self-Regulatory [O]rganization’s investigation.”187 In his
opinion for the court, Judge Friendly explained that where the NYSE acts or
investigates “in pursuance of its own interests and obligations, not as an
180. 139 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 1998).
181. Id. at 647.
182. Id. at 656.
183. Id. at 647–48.
184. Steven Irwin et al., Self-Regulation of the American Retail Securities Markets—An
Oxymoron for What Is Best for Investors?, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1055, 1059 (2012). The
NYSE’s regulatory arm merged in 2007 with the NASD to become FINRA. See id.
185. Alan Lawhead, Useful Limits to the Fifth Amendment: Examining the Benefits That
Flow from a Private Regulator’s Ability to Demand Answers to Its Questions During an
Investigation, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 210, 217.
186. 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975).
187. Lawhead, supra note 185, at 224.
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agent of the [government],” it is not a “state actor” under the Fifth
Amendment.188 Accordingly, an individual is not entitled to the privilege
against self-incrimination in an NYSE interrogation—even if his testimony
is later used against him in a criminal prosecution. A number of other
circuits have relied on the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Solomon to
conclude that other SROs were not state actors. For example, in United
States v. Stevens,189 the Ninth Circuit relied on Judge Friendly’s opinion to
conclude that the privilege against self-incrimination did not apply to
investigators working for an FDIC-insured bank.190 The Seventh Circuit in
Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co.191 similarly relied on Judge Friendly’s
reasoning in Solomon to conclude that the privilege against selfincrimination did not apply to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.192
Where an individual has violated a rule promulgated by the SRO of
which he is a member, what effect should such a violation have on his
potential criminal liability under the securities laws? In United States v.
Finnerty,193 the Second Circuit explained that a violation of a NYSE rule
was not tantamount to a violation of the securities laws. The defendant in
Finnerty was a “specialist” member of the NYSE, meaning that he was the
designated auctioneer for a specific security. Finnerty engaged in the
practice of “interpositioning,” in violation of NYSE rules.194 The Second
Circuit reasoned that the NYSE rules did not represent a reasonable
assurance by Finnerty, to his customers, that he would not engage in
interpositioning—and thus he had not committed a “deceptive act” within
the meaning of section 10(b) merely by violating the rules against
interpositioning.195
Finnerty had important implications for the entire specialist system.196
In the early 2000s, the SEC brought a number of actions against each of the
NYSE specialist firms for violations of SEC Rules 11b-1 and 10b-5,
resulting in administrative settlements of more than $247 million.197 But
188. Solomon, 509 F.2d at 869.
189. 601 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1979).
190. Id. at 1078.
191. 738 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1984).
192. Id. at 186.
193. 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008).
194. Under NYSE Rule 104, traders generally were not allowed to engage in proprietary
trades. When there were two matching orders from different members to the public seeking
to buy and sell a security, Finnerty was required, under the rules, to match the public orders.
Instead of doing so, he interposed himself between the orders—selling shares from his own
account to the member of the public who was seeking to buy, and simultaneously buying
shares at a lower price for his own account from the member of the public who was seeking
to sell. As a result, instead of giving the members of the public a better price, he collected a
“spread” for himself, reflecting the difference in the price he paid and received on the two
orders from members of the public. Id. at 145.
195. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
196. One commenter noted that “by declining to apply Rule 10b-5 to a case of sizeable
Specialist profits, the Finnerty decision . . . dampened the death knell for the Specialist
system.” J. Scott Colesanti, Not Dead Yet: How New York’s Finnerty Decision Salvaged the
Stock Exchange Specialist, 23 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMM. 1, 30 (2008).
197. See id. at 14.
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shortly after the Second Circuit’s decision in Finnerty, the U.S. Attorney
for the Southern District of New York dropped all charges in five specialist
cases that were still pending, explaining that “continued prosecution in
these cases are not in the interests of justice.”198 The Second Circuit’s
jurisprudence had won out again.
C. Development of the “Misappropriation Theory”
of Insider Trading
Neither the Securities Act nor the Exchange Act explicitly prohibits
individuals from trading on the basis of nonpublic information that would
be material to the reasonable investor. Indeed, trading on inside
information was not even prohibited in most jurisdictions at the time the
acts were passed.199 But from the early days of the securities laws, the SEC
and the courts have recognized that “insider trading” is a kind of securities
fraud. The SEC’s decision in Cady, Roberts & Co.200 was the first to
recognize liability for insider trading, reasoning that “the inherent
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing” was a sufficient
basis to hold the violator liable.201
Many of the major legal theories which serve as the foundation of insider
trading law nationwide have roots in Second Circuit jurisprudence. The
Second Circuit was the first court to adopt the “classical theory” of insider
trading in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.202 The defendants in this case
were corporate insiders who had nonpublic information that Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., a mining company, had discovered an unusually large deposit
of copper. Based on this information, the defendants bought securities in
the company. The company’s stock price rose soon after the news was
released, netting the defendants a substantial profit. At the SEC’s urging,
the Second Circuit adopted the reasoning of Cady, Roberts to find the
defendants liable under the securities laws. The Second Circuit’s holding
was cited soon thereafter by nearly all of the circuits for the proposition that
fraud and deceit under the Exchange Act included the failure of a corporate
insider to disclose material nonpublic information to a purchaser or seller
before selling or buying a security.203

198. Anna Driver, U.S Government Drops 5 Ex-NYSE Specialist Cases, REUTERS (Nov.
21, 2006), https://next.westlaw.com (follow “News” hyperlink; then search “U.S.
Government Drops 5 Ex-NYSE Specialist Cases”; then click the second result) [https://
perma.cc/F84K-JRWP].
199. Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST. L.J.
353, 361 (1988).
200. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
201. Id. at 912.
202. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
203. See Eisler v. Stritzler, 535 F.2d 148, 153 (1st Cir. 1976); Gold v. Sloan, 491 F.2d
729, 731 (4th Cir. 1974) (labeling Texas Gulf Sulphur as the maturation of Rule 10b-5);
Swanson v. Am. Consumers Indus., Inc., 475 F.2d 516, 521 (7th Cir. 1973); Wessel v.
Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 282 (9th Cir. 1971); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 172 (3d Cir.
1970); City Nat’l Bank of Fort Smith v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 229–30 (8th Cir. 1970);
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Moreover, the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur articulated a test of
what constitutes material information that would later be adopted by the
Supreme Court. The Texas Gulf Sulphur Court held that material
information includes “facts which affect the probable future of the company
and those which may affect the desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold the
company’s securities.”204 This test was expressly adopted by the Supreme
Court in Basic v. Levinson,205 and the Court’s opinion influenced how
subsequent courts interpreted the disclosure duties of public companies
under the securities laws.206
The Second Circuit was also one of the first courts to expand insider
trading liability beyond corporate insiders. Unlike the Texas Gulf Sulphur
defendants, Vincent Chiarella was not a corporate insider.207 He was
neither wealthy nor well connected—in fact, he was a working class
individual employed by a printing firm, Pandick Press, to set the typeface
and page layouts for various printer jobs, including merger agreements.208
Through his position, however, Chiarella was exposed to highly sensitive
and confidential information about mergers and acquisitions. Although the
names of the buying and target corporations were never stated explicitly,
Chiarella often was able to decipher the actual name of a target company
from its code name. Knowing that the target company’s stock price would
rise after announcement of the merger, he bought stock in USM Corp. after
deciphering the target company’s name from five separate takeover bids for
the company. Chiarella made a substantial profit, but the government
indicted him on an insider trading theory.209
Chiarella argued that he could not be found liable for insider trading
because he was not an insider of the company in which he bought stocks
and had no fiduciary obligation to deal fairly with the sellers of the stock.
Judge Irving Kaufmann, writing for the majority in United States v.
Chiarella,210 rejected his argument, reasoning that liability under the
securities laws was not limited to corporate insiders per se but instead
extended to all market insiders—that is, those who regularly receive
material information not available to the public as a result of their
employment. Chiarella’s breach of a fiduciary duty he owed to his
employer, who entrusted Chiarella with this sensitive information, was
sufficient to sweep Chiarella within the ambit of the securities regulations.
Judge Thomas Meskill, in dissent, argued that Chiarella could not be found

Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433, 435, 437 (6th Cir. 1969); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.,
412 F.2d 700, 702 (5th Cir. 1969).
204. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 849.
205. 485 U.S. 224 (1988); see id. at 238–39.
206. For example, Basic v. Levinson was not a case about insider trading; rather, it was
about whether a company had a duty to disclose that they were in the midst of negotiating a
merger agreement. Id. at 230.
207. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224–25 (1980).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978).
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liable under securities regulations because there was no fraud211: Chiarella
owed no duty to speak because he had no fiduciary relationship with USM
Corp.’s stockholders. Judge Meskill ultimately won the day, as the
Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision and Chiarella’s
conviction, relying on Judge Meskill’s reasoning in his dissent.212
Although ultimately reversed, the Second Circuit’s Chiarella decision
would serve as the first seed for a second theory of insider trading
liability—the “misappropriation theory.” Unlike the classical theory of
insider trading, liability under the misappropriation theory does not require
that the individual be a corporate insider who breaches a fiduciary duty to
her corporation by trading on the basis of material nonpublic information.
Liability under the misappropriation theory is based on an individual’s
breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of confidential information that is
subsequently traded upon. Indeed, Justice Stevens’s Chiarella concurrence
noted that the Supreme Court left open the question of whether insider
trading liability could extend to instances where an individual
misappropriates confidential information from an employer for personal
benefit, even where that individual was not a “corporate insider.” While the
Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative in United States v.
O’Hagan213 almost twenty years later, the Second Circuit had, by that time,
already developed a well-plowed misappropriation theory jurisprudence.
If Chiarella was the seedling that laid the groundwork for the
misappropriation theory, United States v. Newman214—the first case to
explicitly adopt the misappropriation theory—was the tree that grew from
it. James Newman was part of a group (along with Jacques Courtois,
Franklin Carniol, and Constantine Spyropoulos) that, from 1973 through
1978, devised a scheme to use confidential information for the purposes of
securities trading. Courtois and another individual, Adrian Antoniu, would
misappropriate confidential information concerning proposed mergers and
acquisitions from their employers, Morgan Stanley and Kuhn Loeb.215
Courtois and Antoniu then would pass on that confidential information to
Newman, a securities trader, who would pass the information to Carniol and
Spyropoulos, both residents of foreign countries, who used the information
to purchase securities through secret foreign bank accounts and trusts.216
Like Chiarella, Newman was not a corporate insider who fit within the
classical definition of insider trading. The Second Circuit, accordingly,
could have dismissed the charges against him on the ground that he owed
no fiduciary duty to shareholders, as the district court had done. Instead,
the Second Circuit panel took the opportunity to revisit the
misappropriation theory, noting that the Supreme Court had not yet
addressed whether insider trading liability could extend to corporate
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See id. at 1373 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234–37.
521 U.S. 642 (1997).
664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 15–17.
Id.
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outsiders who misappropriated confidential information.217 The court
concluded that, by stealing information from his employer, Newman
engaged in deceitful conduct subject to insider trading liability. Newman’s
act of profiting from that conduct by passing the stolen information along to
others who would purchase securities based on that information, in the
Second Circuit’s opinion, involved a core violation of the securities laws.218
The Newman decision would come to be seen as the first case to seriously
develop and embrace the misappropriation theory of insider trading
liability.219 The House Report on the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984 refers repeatedly to the misappropriation theory, citing Newman.220
References to the misappropriation theory also appear in the legislative
history of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988, where Congress “explicitly revised the private right of action
provision for the purpose of giving standing to . . . traders injured by
violations of the misappropriation theory.”221
The Second Circuit expanded the scope of misappropriation liability in
United States v. Carpenter,222 where the court held that a breach of a
fiduciary duty to an employer who owed a duty to other clients was not
necessary to the misappropriation theory.223 Rather, the circuit found that
the misappropriation theory was premised on the fact that information was
stolen—regardless of whether the employer had a fiduciary duty to keep
information confidential. The Second Circuit thus successfully extended
the power of the securities laws to govern not only corporate insiders, but
any employee with access to material nonpublic information. Carpenter
thus represents the final break from the traditional requirement that there
exist some fiduciary duty between the trader and the target corporation.224
The facts of United States v. Chestman225 caused the Second Circuit to
rein in the expansion of the misappropriation theory. Robert Chestman was
convicted of receiving and trading on material nonpublic information he
received from Keith Loeb, husband to Susan, the niece of a wealthy
217. Id. at 16.
218. Id.
219. See United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 621 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that Newman
was the genesis of the misappropriation theory).
220. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 4–5, 13 n.20 (1983) (“[D]eceitful misappropriation of
confidential information by a fiduciary, whether described as theft, conversion, or breach of
trust has consistently been held to be unlawful. The Congress has not sanctioned a less
rigorous code of conduct under the federal securities laws.”).
221. 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND
PREVENTION § 6:2 (2015). The Second Circuit also applied this theory in SEC v. Materia,
745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), which involved an employee at a printing press who
successfully deciphered the identities of several targets of different mergers and traded on
that information. The Second Circuit affirmed his liability on the ground that he had traded
on misappropriated (i.e., stolen) information.
222. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
223. See id.
224. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566–67 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[W]e
arguably did not break ranks with the traditional theory of insider trading until our holding in
Carpenter.”).
225. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
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entrepreneur, Ira Waldbaum. Ira Waldbaum had substantial holdings in
Waldbaum’s, a large and successful grocery chain that was to be purchased
by another company at a price double its current market value. Ira had
informed his sister, Shirley, of the pending transaction, who, despite Ira’s
instructions to the contrary, told her daughter Susan of the transaction.
When Susan told her husband, Loeb, about the upcoming transaction, he
immediately informed Chestman, who thereafter purchased stock in
Chestman, unlike Carpenter, did not actually
Waldbaum’s.226
misappropriate any information—he only received that information from
Loeb, who received it from his wife. As a result, the Second Circuit held
that the misappropriation theory did not cover his conduct. The majority
refused to hold that family members owe a fiduciary duty to one another.
Thus, because Keith Loeb could not have breached a fiduciary duty to his
family members, Chestman could not be held liable under the securities
regulations.227
Judge Ralph Winter dissented. He contended that the court should have
found that a fiduciary duty among family members could exist in the
context of a family-controlled corporation, like Waldbaum’s. Although
rejected by the majority, Judge Winter’s analysis ultimately won the day.
His analysis was subsequently adopted by other circuits.228 Furthermore,
the SEC later amended the regulation concerning fraudulent and deceitful
securities transactions and cited Judge Winter’s analysis in creating a
fiduciary duty not to disclose confidential information to other family
members.229
The Second Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Newman230 is
likely to be just as influential. Newman concerned the appeal of two hedge
fund managers, Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson, who allegedly
traded based on information about the quarterly earnings of Dell and
NVIDIA that they received through a tipping chain.231 Newman and
Chiasson were several steps removed from the insiders who disclosed the
information. Although the Supreme Court had previously held that the
government was required to prove that a “tippee” knew that the “tipper” had
breached his duty of confidentiality,232 it had not addressed whether those
who received the information also had to know the tipper himself benefited
from the breach in order to be found liable. The Second Circuit reversed
the defendants’ convictions, holding that the government did indeed have to
show that the tippee knew that the tipper benefited from the breach. The
226. Id. at 555.
227. Id. at 570–71.
228. See, e.g., SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003).
229. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2009).
230. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 15-137, 2015 WL 4575840 (Oct. 5,
2015).
231. Tipping is traditionally where a corporate insider gives another individual, usually an
outsider, material nonpublic information. A tipping chain occurs when the person who
receives the information further disseminates the information to others who, in turn, transmit
the information to others, and so on.
232. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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Second Circuit also articulated a narrower view of what could constitute a
personal benefit than what the government had urged. It rejected the
government’s argument that mere friendship could suffice and held that the
benefit received by the tipper “must be of some consequence.”233 With this
decision, the Second Circuit significantly pruned the government’s ability
to prosecute remote tippees.234
D. Decades of Scandals: Insider Trading
in the 1980s and the Dot-Com Era
Given the Second Circuit’s jurisdiction over Wall Street, it is little
surprise that many of the most notorious financial scandals of recent
decades have found their way to the Second Circuit’s docket. One of the
most notorious was the Drexel Burnham Lambert insider trading scandal, a
defining moment of the 1980s. The key player in the scandal was Michael
Milken, the so-called “Junk Bond King,” a Drexel executive with an
outsized personality and ego.235 Milken successfully revolutionized the
non-investment-grade (“junk”) bond market,236 by pioneering a strategy in
which corporate raiders issued junk bonds to finance corporate takeovers.237
After corporate raiders (such as Ivan Boesky) issued junk bonds
underwritten by Drexel, Milken would orchestrate a series of transactions
designed to artificially prop up the value of the bonds and to conceal
weaknesses in the underlying assets.238 In a separate part of the scheme,
Boesky and others often traded on nonpublic information and shared “tips”
about impending mergers or acquisitions that could cause huge swings in
the stock price.239 Boesky, Milken, and several other key players
(including Dennis Levine, Robert Freeman, and Martin Siegel) were all

233. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
234. Notably, the Supreme Court chose to let the Second Circuit’s analysis remain good
law, rather than intervene in this issue. See Newman, 2015 WL 4575840. Even though the
Supreme Court typically grants “sixty to seventy percent” of petitions for certiorari from the
Solicitor General, it denied the Solicitor General’s request in Newman—deferring again to
the Second Circuit’s development of the law in this area. See Patricia A. Millett, “We’re
Your Government and We’re Here to Help”: Obtaining Amicus Support from the Federal
Government in Supreme Court Cases, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 209, 216 n.18 (2009)
(noting that the Solicitor General’s petitions for certiorari are granted “roughly sixty to
seventy percent of the time”). On January 19, 2016, however, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), a Ninth Circuit case that
rejected the Second Circuit’s analysis in Newman. Salman, therefore, should resolve
whether the Second Circuit’s analysis in this area ultimately will stand.
235. See William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal:
From Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 811 (2013)
(describing how Milken presented a “clash of cultures between a white shoe Wall Street and
a larger-than-life, upstart Jewish bond trader, and lurid tales of insider trading, bad toupees,
partying, and excess”).
236. See id. at 795.
237. Id.
238. See id. at 797–98 (noting that this arrangement, termed a “daisy chain” scheme,
involves “an asset [that is] sold back and forth among the chain’s members who book
‘profits’ on each sale even as the fundamental value of the asset does not appreciate”).
239. See generally United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1991).
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convicted of crimes involving illicit trading.240 The Second Circuit was the
final arbiter of their appeals (which were generally rejected).241
The Second Circuit also saw a wave of insider trading cases after the
2009 financial crisis, including the prosecution of Raj Rajaratnam, founder
of the Galleon Group, and Rajat Gupta, a member of Goldman Sachs’s
board of directors.242 On the afternoon of September 23, 2008, Goldman
Sachs held a meeting of its board of directors to approve an investment
from Warren Buffett of $5 billion in Goldman.243 The company was set to
announce the investment at 4:00 p.m. At 3:54 p.m., Gupta’s assistant
placed a call to Rajaratnam’s direct line and connected him to Gupta.
Rajaratnam then instructed several of his fellow traders to begin buying
Goldman stock. The Galleon Group purchased $33 million worth of stock
and made over $1 million when Goldman’s stock rose nearly 7 percent the
morning after the announcement.244
Gupta was convicted on four of six counts, including securities fraud, and
was sentenced to twenty-four months’ imprisonment.245 Rajaratnam was
convicted on nine counts of securities fraud and five counts of conspiracy to
commit securities fraud,246 and was sentenced to 132 months’
imprisonment and ordered to pay over $60 million in fines—the largest
sentence ever handed down in the history of insider trading prosecutions.247
The Second Circuit upheld both convictions on appeal.248 In the aftermath
of the Great Recession, the federal courts in New York sentenced nearly 80
percent of convicted insider traders to prison and the median sentence rose
from eleven months in the 1990s to two-and-a-half years in recent years.249
The government, with the help of careful appellate review by the Second
Circuit, had once again cracked down on the boldest wrongdoers in the
aftermath of a severe recession.

240. Id. at 365.
241. See, e.g., SEC v. Posner, 16 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 1994) (denying Drexel’s appeal of its
conviction for illicit trading practices).
242. See Christopher P. Montagano, Note, The Global Crackdown on Insider Trading: A
Silver Lining to the “Great Recession,” 19 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 575 (2012) (discussing
the recent global crackdown on insider trading in the United States, China, and Europe).
243. United States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2014).
244. Id. at 117–18.
245. Id. at 122.
246. United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 150 (2d Cir. 2013).
247. Id. at 151–52.
248. Id. at 160; see also Gupta, 747 F.3d at 140.
249. See J. Scott Colesanti, Wall Street as Yossarian: The Other Effects of the
Rajaratnam Insider Trading Conviction, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 411, 423 (2011) (noting that
“since 2009, the federal courts in New York have sent convicted insider traders to jail
seventy-nine percent of the time” and “the median sentence for those so incarcerated has
risen to approximately two and a half years . . . as opposed to . . . eleven and a half months
between 1993 and 1999”).

2016]

SECURITIES AND FINANCIAL REGULATION

253

III. IMPORTANT BANKING LAW DECISIONS
Given New York’s importance as a financial center,250 the Second
Circuit has handled not just securities regulation but a wide array of issues
concerning the banking industry and the propriety of banks’ activities.
Disputes about the nature of banks and what they should be allowed to do
are as old as the country itself.251 In 1819, Justice John Marshall, writing
for the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland,252 recognized that “the
happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends” upon banks to
facilitate commerce and industry.253
Many disputes about the powers and limitations of banks involve the
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which attempted to improve the safety of
commercial banks by precluding them from engaging in risky financing
activities. Prior to the twentieth century, national commercial banks had
been prohibited from underwriting securities.254 But because many state
banks were permitted by state law to underwrite securities, in the early part
of the twentieth century, national banks could circumvent the prohibition on
underwriting by affiliating themselves with state banks.255 Congress
approved such arrangements, with the blessing of the Comptroller of the
Currency, through the McFadden Act of 1927.256
After the stock market crash of 1929, and the subsequent economic
depression, approximately 5,000 banks failed—creating concerns that
commercial banks had become too exposed to the risks of the stock market
and the broader economy.257 The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was designed
to increase the safety of commercial banks by separating “Main Street”
commercial banks from Wall Street investment banks. Commercial banks
with federal deposit insurance were permitted to engage only in “the
250. See FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE: RESTRUCTURING THE BANKING INDUSTRY 9
(1987) (noting that the New York Free Banking Act initiated the free banking era and that
the Act’s ideas and language “subsequently were adopted by other state governments and the
federal government”); Bray Hammond, Free Banks and Corporations: The New York Free
Banking Act of 1838, 44 J. POL. ECON. 184, 184–209 (1936) (explaining how the Free
Banking Act in New York established a “distinctly American system of banking” and
describing the Act’s adoption as “the most important event in American banking history”).
251. Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson vehemently disagreed about the role and
structure of banking institutions in America. See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the
Constitutionality of the Bank, February 23, 1791, in THE REPORTS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
88 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1964) (discussing the importance of a national bank and arguing that
Congress had authority to charter a national bank); Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the
Constitutionality of a National Bank, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 265 (Merrill D.
Peterson ed., 1975) (arguing that the incorporation of a bank is outside the scope of
congressional authority and discussing the dangers of a highly centralized national bank).
252. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
253. Id. at 408.
254. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE REGULATION OF
BANKS IN AN ERA OF DEREGULATION 10 (1988).
255. Id.
256. BENTON E. GUP, TOO BIG TO FAIL: POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT
BAILOUTS 87 (2003).
257. Modernization of the Glass-Steagall Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous., and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 33 (1987) (statement of Donald A. Ritchie, Associate
Historian, Senate Historical Office).
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business of banking” and “closely related” activities,258 and were expressly
precluded from engaging in risky financing activities such as underwriting
securities, owning stocks, or affiliating with firms “engaged principally” in
underwriting.259
This legislation introduced difficult line-drawing problems. The broad
language used in the statute left considerable room for federal banking
regulators to determine what constitutes “the business of banking” and what
activities were impermissible.260 Although banking regulators strictly
limited the activities of commercial banks in the decades following the
passage of Glass-Steagall, starting in the 1980s there was a broad push to
reduce unnecessary government regulation—which extended, under
President Reagan’s tenure, to a “comprehensive program of financial
deregulation.”261 The financial industry of the late 1980s looked nothing
like the one that existed when Glass-Steagall was first adopted after the
stock market crash of 1929.262 As Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board
of the Federal Reserve, put it, “the financial system ha[d] evolved beyond
the terms of our laws and [wa]s functioning without effective legislative
guidelines.”263 In that context, federal regulators began to relax some of the
restrictions on commercial banks that had prevailed since the Great
Depression. In a trio of cases, the Securities Industry Association, a
national trade association of broker-dealers, challenged decisions by federal
banking regulators to allow commercial banks to engage in securitiesrelated activities. The Second Circuit uniformly deferred to the judgment
of the banking regulators on these issues.
For example, in Securities Industry Ass’n v. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System,264 the Federal Reserve Board permitted Bank
America Corporation to acquire the Charles Schwab Corporation—the
nation’s largest discount brokerage firm at the time.265 In a decision later

258. Under section 16 of Glass-Steagall, commercial banks may exercise “all such
incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking.” Pub. L. No. 7366, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). Under the Bank Holding Company Act, a bank holding company
may own a nonbanking entity where that entity was engaged in activities that were “closely
related to the business of banking.” Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (1956).
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing the Garn-St. Germain Depository
(Oct. 15, 1982), https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1982/101582b.htm
[https://perma.cc/4XVB-TFT8].
262. SUBCOMM. TELECOMMS. & FIN, 100TH CONG., IMPLICATIONS OF GLASS-STEAGALL
REFORM 4 (Comm. Print 1988) (noting that the laws governing our financial services sector
are fifty-five years old and “are not suited to a dynamic world economy that is guided by
fast-paced transactions in financial instruments that were not even dreamed of when GlassSteagall was enacted, and it is rife with inequities and inconsistencies”).
263. Role of Financial Institutions: Hearing Before H.R. Subcomm. on Telecomm. &
Fin., 100th Cong. 9 (1988) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve).
264. 716 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1983).
265. Section 20 of Glass-Steagall provides in relevant part: “[N]o member bank shall be
affiliated . . . with any corporation, association, business trust, or other similar organization
engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution at
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affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit rejected the Securities
Industry Association’s challenge and upheld the Federal Reserve Board’s
determination.266 The Second Circuit viewed Glass-Steagall as primarily
intended to prevent banks from investing their assets in risky securities like
stocks that could jeopardize the bank’s solvency in the event of a market
downturn.267 Because Schwab acted only as an agent for customers, and
did not commit its own capital to risky investments, and because Schwab’s
revenue from customers “depend[ed] solely on the volume of shares
traded . . . not . . . the sale or purchase of specific securities,” the Second
Circuit agreed with the Federal Reserve Board that a commercial bank
could acquire Schwab.268
Five years later, the Second Circuit upheld Federal Reserve Board orders
allowing nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies to engage in
certain underwriting activities. The Second Circuit concluded that its
policy of deference toward the Federal Reserve supported upholding the
Board’s interpretation of Glass-Steagall as long as that interpretation was
reasonable.269
Subsequently, in Securities Industry Ass’n v. Clarke,270 the Second
Circuit concluded that banks could issue mortgage pass-through
securities—that is, securities created when a mortgage holder forms a pool
of mortgages and sells shares in the pool to investors, a process known as
securitization. Although mortgage pass-throughs were registered securities
under securities law, the Second Circuit found that issuing the securities
was not an impermissible underwriting activity but merely a convenient and
useful means of carrying out the traditional “business of banking”271—
raising capital through the securitization process, instead of through
traditional deposit taking. Writing for the circuit, Judge Thomas Meskill
reiterated the great deference that the Second Circuit gave to banking
regulators on issues of this nature.272 The deregulation that the Second
wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or
other securities.” Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162.
266. Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 716 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.
1983), aff’d, 468 U.S. 207 (1984).
267. Id. at 97–98.
268. Id. at 98.
269. Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.
1988). This decision had its detractors. Congressman Norman F. Lent noted after the
decision, “Earlier this week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the [S]econd [C]ircuit issued an
opinion that significantly expands the authority of bank subsidiaries to engage in securities
activities . . . lead[ing] me to ask, what are the proper roles of the banking agencies, the
courts, and Congress in the Glass-Steagall debate?” Role of Financial Institutions: Hearing
on H.R. 2557 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. & Fin., 100th Cong. 437 (1988)
(statement of Hon. Norman F. Lent, Member, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
Finance).
270. 885 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1989).
271. Id. at 1043.
272. In a 1992 decision, the Second Circuit also limited the sweep of the securities laws
as applicable to the business of banking, holding that “loan participations” (a transaction
where a bank sells to third parties interests in a loan) were not securities. Banco Espanol de
Credito v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992).
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Circuit had allowed federal banking regulators to undertake ultimately
culminated in the repeal of Glass-Steagall with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act in 1999.273
Although the Second Circuit has principally focused on questions of
domestic banking law, given New York’s status as the world’s preeminent
financial center, the circuit has occasionally weighed in on global banking
affairs. The sovereign debt default involving Argentina is a recent example
of a particularly important international banking case.274 Argentina
restructured its sovereign debt in 2005, persuading most bondholders to
accept major write-downs to the principal value of the debt. A small
minority of bondholders held out for full repayment, and, when Argentina
refused to make further payments on their debt, the holdouts sued Argentina
in New York for violating the pari passu clause of their debt contracts,
which required Argentina to afford equal treatment to bondholders. The
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the pari passu clause
precluded Argentina from paying only bondholders who had accepted
write-downs, while refusing to pay the holdouts.
This case is a noteworthy testament to the importance of the Second
Circuit not just in New York but globally. Although the case involved a
matter of Argentina’s national debt, the Second Circuit had jurisdiction over
the dispute because Argentina waived its sovereign immunity and
consented to the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit and trial courts in New
York City. Such waivers are common in sovereign debt issues in emerging
markets—reflecting the high esteem in which the Second Circuit and other
New York courts are held all over the world.275 Moreover, in the Argentina
case, the Second Circuit explicitly acknowledged the sometimes symbiotic
relationship between New York’s judicial system and the city’s success as a
world financial center: rejecting policy arguments from Argentina that
strictly enforcing the debt contract would “steer bond issuers from the New
York marketplace,” Judge Parker noted that, “On the contrary, our decision
affirms a proposition [of freedom of contract] essential to the integrity of
the capital markets.”276
Whether because it has helped ensure the integrity of the securities
market by helping to develop antifraud and insider trading law, or because
of its flexible oversight of banking regulation, there can be little doubt that
New York owes no small measure of its success to its robust judicial system
and strong commitment to the rule of the law.277 Just as Delaware’s strong
legal system has helped that state to maintain a preeminent position in the
273. See 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012).
274. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012); EM
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Republic of
Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014).
275. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Debt and Sovereign Immunity, 2014 U. ILL.
L. REV. 67, 69, 73–88.
276. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 248 (2d Cir. 2013).
277. Cf. Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001) (discussing the legal and market institutions
necessary for an economy to develop a strong securities market).
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field of corporations and trusts,278 so too has the Second Circuit’s
jurisprudence helped to maintain investor confidence in New York as a
leading world financial center.

278. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 668–72 (1974).
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